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Merleau-Ponty, Embodied Cognition and Enactivism

Merleau-Ponty, Embodied Cognition and Enactivism

Drawing on Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological work on embodiment and perception, Jack Reynolds develops a novel account of many of the recent debates in enactivism and embodied cognition, engaging specifically with the epistemological and metaphysical aspects of these views. Reynolds sets out a Merleau-Ponty inspired view of enactive cognition, arguing that it presents the best overall explanation of both phenomenological considerations and a range of scientific evidence concerning life and mind. He defends the view against a variety of alternative positions across the putative analytic-continental divide, including predictive processing, illusionism and computationalism.
$39.55

Original: $112.99

-65%
Merleau-Ponty, Embodied Cognition and Enactivism

$112.99

$39.55

Merleau-Ponty, Embodied Cognition and Enactivism

Drawing on Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological work on embodiment and perception, Jack Reynolds develops a novel account of many of the recent debates in enactivism and embodied cognition, engaging specifically with the epistemological and metaphysical aspects of these views. Reynolds sets out a Merleau-Ponty inspired view of enactive cognition, arguing that it presents the best overall explanation of both phenomenological considerations and a range of scientific evidence concerning life and mind. He defends the view against a variety of alternative positions across the putative analytic-continental divide, including predictive processing, illusionism and computationalism.

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Drawing on Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological work on embodiment and perception, Jack Reynolds develops a novel account of many of the recent debates in enactivism and embodied cognition, engaging specifically with the epistemological and metaphysical aspects of these views. Reynolds sets out a Merleau-Ponty inspired view of enactive cognition, arguing that it presents the best overall explanation of both phenomenological considerations and a range of scientific evidence concerning life and mind. He defends the view against a variety of alternative positions across the putative analytic-continental divide, including predictive processing, illusionism and computationalism.